

**Page Denied**

Next 38 Page(s) In Document Denied

PRINCETON/SEPT87/8SEPT

CIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

DESPITE A GROWING AND MOSTLY RESPECTABLE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON INTELLIGENCE, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA AND ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY MOVIES, TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OR ALLEGATIONS OF MISDEEDS, HEADLINES GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, GRANDSTANDING PUBLIC FIGURES, EXPOSES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST EXTERNALLY SUPERVISED AND MOST WRITTEN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE CAN SOMETIMES PUBLICLY REFUTE ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM AGAINST US, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF PUBLIC IMAGES OF CIA AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

TONIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO SHED SOME LIGHT ON AND I HOPE EXPAND UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:

- FIRST, THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO POLICYMAKERS, PRINCIPALLY THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE -- ALTHOUGH IN RECENT YEARS TREASURY, COMMERCE AND MANY OTHERS HAVE BECOME MAJOR USERS OF INTELLIGENCE.
- SECOND, THE INTERACTION, MAINLY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN CIA AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY. IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDDED OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE, PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL.
- THIRD, CIA'S ROLE IS MANIFESTED IN COVERT ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE ARE ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.

THE FIRST OF THESE, COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, IS A FAIRLY WELL KNOWN AREA, AND I WILL SPEAK TO IT ONLY SUMMARILY. THE LAST, COVERT ACTION, IS ALL TOO FAMILIAR, AND I SEE NO NEED

HERE TO EXPAND UPON WHAT YOU HAVE READ AND SEEN. IT IS THE SECOND, THE DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY, THAT IS LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA I WILL FOCUS UPON TONIGHT.

### COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

LET ME START WITH A FEW FACTS TO GIVE YOU PERSPECTIVE. GIVEN THE MEDIA'S ATTENTION TO COVERT ACTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION, ALONG WITH REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. ONLY ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF CIA'S PEOPLE WORK ON COVERT ACTION.

NOW, IF CIA IS NOT SPENDING MOST OF ITS TIME OR MONEY TRYING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES IT DO? CIA DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF ITS TIME, EFFORT AND MONEY TO DETERMINING POLICYMAKERS' REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND, THEN, IN A HIGHLY FOCUSED AND PRIORITIZED PROCESS, CIA PREPARES INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION STRATEGIES AND RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS PROGRAMS. OUR INFORMATION COMES FROM SATELLITES; NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, RADIOS, AND TELEVISION AROUND THE WORLD; DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY ATTACHES OVERSEAS; AND, OF COURSE, FROM CLASSIC SPIES. THAT INFORMATION FLOWS TO

WASHINGTON WHERE, WITH BACKGROUNDS IN SCORES OF DISCIPLINES, ANALYSTS SIFT THROUGH IT, EXAMINE IT, COLLATE IT, AND TRY TO MAKE SENSE OF THE BILLIONS OF BITS AND PIECES THAT COME TO US ON ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS WORLD-WIDE OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. WE THEN REPORT OUR FINDINGS TO POLICY OFFICIALS AND MILITARY COMMANDERS.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND HOW IS IT USED BY THE POLICYMAKER? THE KEY IS RELEVANCE TO US POLICY AND US INTERESTS. IT IS THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF OUR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, THEIR FOCUS ON US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND THE ADVANTAGE OF UNIQUE OR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, THAT MAKE INTELLIGENCE VALUABLE TO THE POLICYMAKER. OFTEN, WE MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION SIMPLY THROUGH OUR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE THE FACTS IN A CLEAR AND CONCISE WAY, BY PROVIDING THE SAME FACTS TO DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND BY ASCERTAINING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS -- AND ANSWERING THEM.

THIS INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER IN MANY WAYS:

- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN MORE FREQUENTLY.

- SECOND, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS DESCRIBING BOTH EVENTS AT HAND AND POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES. NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.
- THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIEWS AND ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.

THE VALUE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ESTIMATES VARIES. SOME THAT HAVE THE MOST IMPACT, LIKE THE MILITARY ESTIMATES, RECEIVE MODEST ATTENTION AT THE TOP LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, BUT ARE INVALUABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND OUR MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD. THOSE ON PROBLEMS THAT ARE IMPORTANT BUT ON WHICH FEW POLICYMAKERS ARE EXPERT -- LIKE THE PERSIAN GULF, CAMBODIA, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRADE OR THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AFRICA -- ARE READ CLOSELY, AS ARE THOSE ON CERTAIN ECONOMIC ISSUES. SOME ESTIMATES, SUCH AS THE ONE ON MEXICO, GET ATTENTION BECAUSE THEY ARE PROVOCATIVE;

OTHERS, SUCH AS ON NICARAGUA, BECAUSE THE SUBJECT ITSELF IS CONTROVERSIAL.

-- FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY; MINERAL RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; SUPPLIES OF ENERGY AND OIL TO FORCED LABOR CAMPS; SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS; CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.

### CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS

SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT I HAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. NEAT, UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE -- AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE; OR USERS WHO LABEL INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT OR TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN

AGENDA; OR BIASED ANALYSTS; OR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO CLAIM A CERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OR HISTORY; OR IMPERFECT COLLECTION SET AGAINST UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS; OR THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE OR ONE HELD TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THEM TOGETHER COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND CIA'S ROLE -- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM CALLS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."

IN 1949, SHERMAN KENT, IN HIS BOOK STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY, SAID "THERE IS NO PHASE OF THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE ITS PRODUCT. ODDLY ENOUGH, THIS RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ONE WOULD EXPECT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AUTOMATICALLY, DOES NOT DO THIS."

THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT



OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHER'S WORLD -- PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN TELL YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."

BOOKSHELVES GROAN UNDER THE LITERATURE OF PROPOSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHEN THESE TWO WORLDS COLLIDE. IN 1956, FOR EXAMPLE, ROGER HILSMAN SAID INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS MUST "ORIENT THEMSELVES FRANKLY AND CONSCIOUSLY TOWARD POLICY AND ACTION ... ADAPTING TOOLS EXPRESSLY TO THE NEEDS OF POLICY." OTHERS, AS DESCRIBED IN ONE INTELLIGENCE MONOGRAPH, ARGUED THAT "THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER SHOULD INITIATE NO DIRECT INTERACTION WITH HIS CONSUMERS, BUT RATHER SHOULD RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR DATA AND ANALYSIS."

SHERMAN KENT WAS PERHAPS THE FIRST OF THE EARLY INTELLIGENCE COMMENTATORS TO SEE THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT, MORE DIRECT AND INTENSIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. WARNING THAT PROTECTING THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST COULD BE LIKENED TO PILING ARMOR ON

A MEDIEVAL KNIGHT UNTIL HE WAS ABSOLUTELY SAFE BUT COMPLETELY USELESS, KENT CONCLUDED THAT THE GREATER DANGER TO AN EFFECTIVE ROLE WAS IN BEING TOO DISTANT. EVEN SO, HE FORESAW A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP -- THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS' SKEPTICISM OF POLICYMAKERS' OBJECTIVITY -- AND THE LATTER'S CONSEQUENT RESENTMENT -- WOULD STULTIFY A FREE GIVE AND TAKE BETWEEN THEM; THAT POLICYMAKERS WOULD SEE THE VERY FACT OF CIA ASSESSMENTS AS AN INSULT TO THEIR OWN INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES; THAT SECURITY CONCERNS BY EACH PARTY WOULD ENCOURAGE WARINESS AND RETICENCE. AND, IN TRUTH, THESE AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES STILL LARGELY SHAPE CIA'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS.

LET ME ELABORATE ON THESE DIFFICULTIES -- ON THE REALITY OF A ROUGH AND TUMBLE WORLD -- BASED ON PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN BOTH WORLDS AT DIFFERENT TIMES UNDER FIVE PRESIDENTS.

THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND, THE POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, SOME LEGITIMATE, SOME NOT.

-- THEY LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET THEIR NEEDS. IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE WERE ABLE TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL CHEATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE ARE SOME AREAS WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, WE WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE US WHERE SUCH TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED. OUR CAPABILITIES ARE MUCH IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STILL UNEVEN. AND NO MATTER HOW GOOD WE ARE, THERE WILL OCCASIONALLY STILL BE SURPRISES OR GAPS. CONTRARY TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF SOME, AND CONVICTIONS OF OTHERS, WE ARE NOT, AND CANNOT BE, OMNISCIENT. THAT IS A QUALITY RESERVED TO A HIGHER KIND OF INTELLIGENCE.

-- IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT POLICYMAKERS DO NOT LIKE CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR ADEQUACY OF THEIR POLICIES OR

PROGRAMS. WHETHER ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL QUALITY OF SOVIET WEAPONS, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INTENTIONS OF OTHERS, DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON OR ANGOLA, OR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, I HAVE YET TO SEE A POLICYMAKER WELCOME A VIEW THAT CHALLENGES HIS DECISIONS, POLICIES OR PROGRAMS. AND, YET, I ALSO CONCEDE THAT ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, POLICYMAKERS HAVE READ A SITUATION BETTER THAN WE.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER OFTEN HAS THE SENSE THAT CIA IS ATTEMPTING, AT LEAST BY INFERENCE, TO "GRADE" HIS PERFORMANCE AND THEN DISPROPORTIONATELY TO REPORT DEFICIENCIES TO A WIDE AUDIENCE -- WHO WILL THEN USE THAT VERY INTELLIGENCE AS AMMUNITION TO ATTACK HIM INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WITH CONGRESS, OR PUBLICLY.

-- OFTEN POLICYMAKERS, FACING A SITUATION OF EXTREME DELICACY WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY WHERE US LAW OR POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES MAY BE INVOLVED, WILL CAUTION US AS WE WRITE OR BRIEF: "NOW, YOU HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THIS -- LET'S WORK IT OUT TOGETHER BEFOREHAND." AND WE DO TRY TO BE CAREFUL AND WE DO TRY TO TAKE THEIR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT -- BUT THAT IS LITTLE SOLACE TO A POLICYMAKER WHO IS AT THE POLITICAL MERCY OF ANY CIA BRIEFER WHO GOES TO CAPITOL HILL.

-- MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO DOMINATE ITS REPORTING. I WOULD NOTE THAT THIS CHARGE IS MADE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY WHEN THE POLICYMAKER DISAGREES WITH THAT REPORTING. WHO WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA OFFICERS HAVE VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE. WE HAVE ELABORATE PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE ANALYSIS BY AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT AS A PERSONAL VIEW.

BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE BROADEST SENSE, AND PERHAPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. AS AN INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO THEIR ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE US CAN USUALLY AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY, WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS DO NOT.

FINALLY, SUSPICIONS THAT CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE BIASED IN AREAS WHERE CIA IS INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR REALIZATION THAT OUR WORK IN SUCH AREAS IS SCRUTINIZED WITH SPECIAL CARE BY OTHERS FOR SIGNS OF BIAS -- NOT TO MENTION THE ORGANIZATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANALYSIS FROM OPERATIONS, BUTTRESSED BY INTERNAL AGENCY RIVALRIES.

-- POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE -- WITH CIA -- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY, AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.

-- AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, A SPECIAL CRITICISM BY POLICYMAKERS IS THAT CIA IS TOO FREQUENTLY A VOICE OF GLOOM AND DOOM. FOR POLICYMAKERS WHO MUST TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS FOR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS OR A WAY OUT OF A NO-WIN SITUATION, OUR FOREBODINGS AND POINTING OUT OF PERILS AND DANGERS ARE OF LITTLE HELP AND ARE HIGHLY AGGRAVATING.

-- FINALLY, CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS IS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. FIRST, VIRTUALLY ALL CIA ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. LAST YEAR, CIA GAVE SOME 1600 BRIEFINGS ON CAPITOL HILL. AS A RESULT, AND THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES ARE BETTER INFORMED ABOUT CIA'S INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER, AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION. WHEN CONTEMPLATING HISTORICAL WATERSHEDS SUCH AS WATERGATE AND VIETNAM THAT ALTERED THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, I BELIEVE A THIRD FORCE WAS EQUALIZING THE TWO BRANCHES' ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE IN THE MID-1970S.

SECOND, THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS HAS GIVEN CONGRESS -- ESPECIALLY THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES -- FAR GREATER INFLUENCE AND EVEN CONTROL OVER THE WAY CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SPEND THEIR MONEY THAN ANYONE IN THE EXECUTIVE WOULD DREAM OF EXERCISING:

FROM EXPENDITURES IN THE BILLIONS TO LINE ITEMS IN THE THOUSANDS. CONGRESS HAS BEEN IMMENSELY SUPPORTIVE AND STEADFAST IN PROVIDING THE RESOURCES OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS TO REBUILD AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. BUT IT CAUSES POLICYMAKERS CONSIDERABLE HEARTBURN TO KNOW THAT CONGRESS IN FACT HAS MORE INFLUENCE TODAY OVER OUR PRIORITIES AND HOW WE SPEND OUR MONEY THAN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

FINALLY, THE POLICYMAKER KNOWS THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT HE CAN ASK CIA TO DO THAT WILL NOT BE SHARED WITH THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES.

THE RESULT OF THESE REALITIES IS THAT CIA TODAY IS IN A REMARKABLE POSITION, POISED NEARLY EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES -- THE FORMER KNOWING THAT CIA IS IN NO POSITION TO WITHHOLD MUCH FROM CONGRESS AND IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO IT, AND THE LATTER WITH ENORMOUS INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION YET SUSPICIOUS AND MISTRUSTFUL. THIS MAY BE OR MAY NOT BE HISTORICALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF OTHER EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS' RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS, ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT NOT. REGARDLESS, SUCH A DOMINANT LEGISLATIVE ROLE WITH RESPECT TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS UNIQUE IN OUR HISTORY AND IN THE WORLD. AND OUR POLICYMAKERS KNOW IT.



NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA'S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICYMAKER AS SEEN FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT.

-- FIRST, LET ME SAY THAT IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION DURING WHICH I HAVE SERVED THERE HAS BEEN A NUMBER OF SENIOR POLICYMAKERS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND ABOVE) WHO WERE AVID USERS AND READERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND WHO AGGRESSIVELY SOUGHT CIA ANALYSIS AND VIEWS. THEY DEDICATED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO TALKING ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ESPECIALLY FOR ANALYSIS, AND DAILY CONTACT WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THEY HAVE OFTEN DIRECTLY TASKED US AND OFFERED REACTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE THEY READ -- AND THEY HAVE READ A GREAT DEAL. THIS IS EVEN MORE TRUE OF THEIR SENIOR SUBORDINATES, WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE, TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR ANALYSIS AND OTHER SUPPORT. IT IS A VERY HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, MOST POLICYMAKERS' INTEREST IN INTELLIGENCE IS FOCUSED ON CURRENT EVENTS OR CRISIS INFORMATION. ONE OF OUR GREATEST CONCERNS OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THE UNWILLINGNESS OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON LONGER RANGE ISSUES OR IN HELPING TO GUIDE OR DIRECT OUR EFFORTS. FOR MANY YEARS WE HAVE STRUGGLED, LARGELY IN VAIN, TO GET POLICY OFFICIALS TO DEVOTE TIME TO NON-CRISIS RELATED INTELLIGENCE ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WORK HARD TO DETERMINE THEIR REQUIREMENTS -- WHAT ARE THEIR PRIORITIES, WHAT ISSUES OR PROBLEMS SHOULD WE ADDRESS, HOW CAN WE HELP? ONE REASON CONGRESS HAS ASSUMED A LARGER ROLE IN THESE AREAS, IN MY VIEW, IS BECAUSE POLICYMAKERS FOR YEARS HAVE LARGELY ABDICATED THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. TRYING TO GET SENIOR POLICY PRINCIPALS TO MEETINGS EVEN ONCE A YEAR TO DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS IS A EXERCISE IN FRUSTRATION. BEYOND THE LACK OF HELP ON REQUIREMENTS, WE GET LITTLE FEEDBACK ON WHAT WE DO, GOOD OR BAD, TO HELP US BE MORE RESPONSIVE. WE HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN RECENT YEARS IN TRYING TO ENGAGE POLICYMAKERS ON THESE MATTERS, AND KEY FIGURES IN THIS ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN FAR MORE ACCESSIBLE THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS, BUT THERE IS STILL A GREAT VOID.

- IN PART BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT ON INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT, WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO ANYTHING.
- WE FIND MOST POLICYMAKERS SO FOCUSED ON CURRENT PROBLEMS THAT THERE IS TOO OFTEN A RELUCTANCE TO LOOK AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS OR TO PAY ATTENTION TO LONGER TERM PROBLEMS WE IDENTIFY. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD, THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, SUCH A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, COSTLY TO THE COUNTRY.
- FINALLY, IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE IS EITHER TO IGNORE IT; TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO-NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT; OR TO CHARGE THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN 21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE) CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH WHICH HE AGREED.

THERE IS NO CHARGE TO WHICH WE IN CIA ARE MORE SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF "COOKING" INTELLIGENCE -- OF SLANTING OUR REPORTING TO SUPPORT POLICY. EVERY DIRECTOR SINCE I JOINED CIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF THIS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, I BELIEVE IN VIRTUALLY ALL INSTANCES UNFAIRLY. FIRST, ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS. NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE REVIEWED AND COORDINATED BY A DOZEN AGENCIES; CIA ASSESSMENTS ARE WIDELY REVIEWED INSIDE THE AGENCY BUT ALMOST NEVER EVEN SEEN BY THE DIRECTOR BEFORE BEING PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED. AS NOTED EARLIER, VIRTUALLY ALL GO TO SEVERAL COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, WHERE THEY ARE SCRUTINIZED.

THESE FORMAL PRODUCTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM PERSONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE AGENCY, FROM ANALYST TO SENIOR OPERATIONS OFFICER TO DIRECTOR. MORE THAN ONCE, DCI CASEY (AND PROBABLY HIS PREDECESSORS) APPROVED AN ESTIMATE WITH WHICH HE DISAGREED PERSONALLY, AND SEPARATELY CONVEYED HIS PERSONAL VIEW TO POLICYMAKERS. LEST THIS RAISE EYEBROWS, I REMIND YOU THAT IN 1962 DCI MCCONE DISAGREED WITH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON WHETHER THERE WERE MISSILES IN CUBA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY THEY WERE THERE, AND HE ALONE IN THE EXECUTIVE

BRANCH WAS RIGHT. AND, I SHOULD ADD, IT COST HIM HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. AS LONG AS ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE FAIRLY REPRESENTED AND REPORTED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE ADVISER -- IS ENTITLED (EVEN OBLIGATED) TO HAVE AND TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEW.

POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN OR NARROW THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO INTIMIDATE. THIS IS WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.

BUT, OVERALL, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GIVE AND TAKE -- THE DIALOGUE -- BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON ISSUES IS NORMAL, HEALTHY, AND USUALLY IMPROVES OUR ASSESSMENTS AND MAKES THEM MORE USEFUL TO THE POLICYMAKER -- EVEN WHILE OBJECTIVITY IS PRESERVED. WE KNOW THEY ARE OFTEN TRYING TO INFLUENCE AN ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT DOES NOT RENDER THEIR

INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS IRRELEVANT OR OFF-LIMITS. FOR US, THERE ARE TWO IRREVOCABLE CAVEATS: INTELLIGENCE MUST NEVER SERVE AS AN ADVOCATE OF ONE SET OF POLICIES OVER ANOTHER, OR TAKE SIDES IN THE POLICY DEBATE.

A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES THE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD ALSO BE FOOLISH -- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS AS WELL AS THE EXECUTIVE IS ONE OF THE SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN, OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT. POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED."

## CONCLUSION

WHAT I HAVE TRIED TO DESCRIBE TONIGHT IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING, DAY IN AND DAY OUT -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS IMPACT. SOME OF OUR ANALYSES ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; SOME INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; SOME ESTIMATES ALLEGED TO BE POLITICIZED OR BIASED WERE NOT THAT AT ALL -- THEY WERE JUST NOT VERY WELL DONE. BUT UNEVENNESS OF QUALITY SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH POLITICIZATION. CIA'S AUTONOMY IN OUR GOVERNMENT IS UNIQUE IN WASHINGTON; ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ARE A DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND CONFLICT. OUR CHALLENGE IS TO MANAGE THOSE RELATIONSHIPS SO THAT THE WHOLE RANGE OF INTERACTIONS -- SUPPORTIVE AND ADVERSARIAL -- NET OUT TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AN EVER MORE COMPLEX WORLD AROUND US AND HENCE BETTER INFORMED DECISIONS AND POLICY.

THE REAL INTELLIGENCE STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS, PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND WE CARRY IT OUT WITH INTEGRITY, DEDICATION, AND SKILL. THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS -- ALL SOMETIMES WITH CLENCHED TEETH -- DEPEND UPON US, TASK US, AND LOOK TO US MORE EACH DAY. WE ATTRACT AMERICA'S BRIGHTEST YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO FIND WITH US EXCEPTIONALLY CHALLENGING, HONORABLE, AND CONSISTENTLY FASCINATING CAREERS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOMS AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. CIA IS TRULY AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS. AND, I ASSURE YOU, OUR DEEPEST COMMITMENT, TO BORROW A PHRASE USED TO DESCRIBE GEORGE MARSHALL, IS "TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER" -- AT LEAST THE TRUTH AS WE HONESTLY UNDERSTAND IT.



**Page Denied**

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

A

**Page Denied**

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied



**Page Denied**

Next 13 Page(s) In Document Denied